7. Putting a Human Face on Ultimate Truths

A very brief history of western philosophy - Part 2: Kant to Present

Starting with an inquiry into how one can know what to believe with certainty, we have turned onto a path exploring the history of Western philosophical thought. The classical philosophers fleshed out many of the conundrums that, as we try to justify our beliefs in everyday life, lie hidden beneath the surface and threaten to undermine our knowledge, or leave it vulnerable in cross-examination. In my brutally abridged encapsulation of the evolution of Western thought I have focused on questions of the nature of truth, reality, and knowledge, and have, for this and the previous essay, left out issues such as ethics, aesthetics, culture, and politics which also occupied the thoughts of many early philosophers.

Our exploration left off with Immanuel Kant, who both reached a pinnacle in philosophical thought by clarifying many of the issues that preceded him, and opened a Pandora’s box of new problems that would eventually decimate the field of dreams for lasting truths planted by Plato, Aristotle, and others.

Kant was the first major western philosopher to put the human subject in the forefront of attempts to find ultimate truths. Prior attempts can be seen as looking outward into the world of ideals for a kind of perfect, absolute, or fundamental crutch that reason could lean on to work around and compensate for the unseemly irrationalities of the human condition. Kant said, in effect, that in evaluating the products of thought, we not only must look at the quality of the starting materials and the skill of the craftsman, but we must inspect the quality of the tool itself–the human mind.

Kant pointed out how our prior experience and preconceptions unavoidably shape, focus, and filter our beliefs. Philosophers had been refining the principles of logic and reason since Aristotle, but starting with Kant they also began looking closely at the overarching limitations of logic and reason, and of knowledge. The average educated person today is familiar with the idea that people actively construct their reality, i.e. that what we perceive and believe is influenced by various types of biases, and that we can not take fallible human nature out of the loop when looking for the truth about reality. It is hard to imagine that such notions, now part of the repertoire of “common sense” in modern society, were radical bleeding edge insights to the intellectual elite only 200 years ago. ^later.">1

There are several ironies about Kant’s work. You might think that someone who’s forte was putting reason in its proper perspective would appreciate the social, romantic, emotional, irrational, and embodied elements of life, and include those elements in his philosophy. But Kant was a notably stodgy intellectual taking scant heed of human relationships or the world of pleasures. He did not seem to have much compassion for the fallibilities of the human condition, and was said to be excessively tidy and timely. He confidently worked out solutions to questions of empirical science, morality, and even aesthetics and spirituality, in a hyper-logical way. His theories of morality, though well regarded, have a quality of strictness and inflexibility (focusing on “duty”).

Yet, in turning the attention of scholars irrevocably toward a study of the human mind, he tore the lid off of a bubbling, buzzing, bewildering caldron of questions which not only paved the way for whole new productive fields of study, but, as mentioned, opened up previously undisclosed tracts of cognitive disequilibrium. All major Western philosophers after Kant (even his critics) were influenced by the paradigm shift he wrought, yet they were able to use his work to stake claims in varied and incompatible directions, some of which Kant would never have approved of (which we know from his caustic critiques of such directions begun before his death). And some Kant had barely conceived of. For example, though Kant exposed the flaws in individual human thought and knowledge (”cognition”), it remained for others to extend the critique of reason to the social and cultural dimension (of “intersubjectively”).

I will briefly describe some of the directions philosophical thought took from Kant to the current period. (Some of these theme will be explored in depth in other essays.)

Scientific materialism. One direction of thought, still alive today, is Scientific Materialism (related terms are Positivism and Scientism )–a rejection of metaphysical pronouncements, and a narrowing of inquiry to that which we can clearly observe with our senses and what can be logically concluded. In other words, lets stick to what we can be certain of, the floofy subjective stuff is a waste of time. Positivism (or “logical positivism”) in part it draws from Kant’s clarity about the role of rational thought, but was also a reaction to the unpalatability of the Pandora’s box he opened.

The positivist attitude is associated with the marvels of modern technological progress, everything from extended life span to the internet. Yet clearly this view has its problems and its detractors. Overemphasis on the logical and concrete ignores so much of what is meaningful in life (love, art, spirit, etc.). And, in a world where dealing with diverse opinions and complexity is increasingly important, narrowing our interests and inquiry to that which we can be most certain about is simply dangerous. It is like the adage about looking for your keys under the street light because the light is best there.

Finally, while the baby (the utilitarian benefits) of positivist thinking should not be thrown out with the bath water of its strict adherence, positivism was “eventually discredited [because it was realized that it was] virtually impossible to eliminate metaphysical [and subjective] statements from science.”²

Subjectivity. Kant’s legitimation of the subjective aspects of knowldge led to a deeper and more rigorous exploration of subjective experience and intuition (see Phenomenology , including the works of Husserl and Heidegger . It also lead to the existentialist turn away from abstract ideas about the human predicament, toward an embodied, worldly-acting, emotionally alive view of humans as vulnerable specimens full of contradictions, foibles, and absurdities (see for example Nietzsche, Dostoevsky, and Sartre ).

Cognition and the unconscious Deeper explorations of the mind lead to both cognitive science and psychological theory. Cognitive science has show experimentally how reason is limited and how our concepts and unexamined ways of categorizing bias deliberation (see later essays on Lakoff, Simon, Kahneman). Freud’s revelations about the unconscious mind put further suspicion on man’s ability to make rational decisions.

Language. While some were gaining perspective on philosophical questions by investigating the mind others were doing so investigating language itself in ways that were barely conceived of before the 20th century. This work (coined the “linguistic turn” in philosophy) was able to reveal some of the structures and limitations of cognition and communication through the analysis of language and communication. If we don’t have a word for some possible idea, a concept nailed down in language, it is difficult to manufacture thoughts about it, and nearly impossible for that idea to impact others. Some of the unsolvable knots that philosophers got themselves into turn out to be due to the nature of language, rather than some mysterious puzzle in reality. (See later essays on Lakoff, Rosch, Pinker.)

The linguistic turn also revealed that language is not simply a system for the expression of ideas, but a flesh-and-blood act committed for some purpose. Spoken statements, once treated by philosophers as merely propositions whose truth and logic could be assessed, were also seen to contain layers of implied meaning. For example: what we leave out of a statement may communicate something; or, the very fact that I answer someone’s question may imply a kind of acknowledgement or respect for them or their position. (See more at Wittgenstein,  Searle, Derrida , Habermas.)

Culture and identity. Another post-Kantian philosophical trajectory revealed that knowledge was not only structured and biased by one’s experiences, language, and concepts, but by one’s culture (and by the historical progression of events influencing culture). It would seem that we are unavoidably bound by the assumptions programmed into us by society, prisoners to historically determined perspectives that define the horizon of what we can comprehend. And this makes it difficult to understand or judge the seemingly illogical or immoral beliefs held by those in other cultures.

A related thread speaks to how our beliefs are shaped by our interests what we identify with (cultural, ethnic, political, ideological identities, etc.), and how identity is socially constructed (see G.H. Mead). Another related thread reveals how not only individuals, but each community of inquiry and practice, including any scientific or scholarly community, develops its own paradigm which constrains the acceptable dialogs within it. Science can not escape from the indictment that its very vocabulary and method are socially constructed as opposed to logical givens (see Foucault , Kuhn, Latour).

Meaning. Along similar lines others studied meaning itself. The meaning or interpretation of a word or and idea can vary widely. For example, the words “patriotism” “integrity” and “spirit” may engender entirely different visions among various friends of yours. One might hope that rigorous-thinking philosophers could avoid the sloppiness of language, but quite the opposite turns out to be true. The more abstract and theoretical a word or idea, the greater its indeterminacy, and philosophers deal with the most abstract of ideas (see Hermenutics, Gadamer, Lakoff).

Indeed, what is most striking about the world of philosophical discourse is the drastic difference of opinion about what other philosophers meant (especially famous dead ones). Modern philosophers, like most scholars, present their work in the context of other thinkers and theories, and are constantly linking their ideas to the published ideas of others. Philosophers who see themselves as building directly upon (or in contrast to) the work of the notables who preceded them can have vastly different interpretations of what the great thinkers meant when they penned their great works. I mentioned above how Kant’s work was followed by divergent interpretations. One can find assertions such as these throughout the philosophical literature: “Plato’s theory [of ideas, the] exact philosophical meaning of which is perhaps one of the most disputed questions in…philosophy…” “The views of most of [those following Wittgenstein] are generally contradictory…”

For some (see Derrida ), revelations about the fundamental ambiguity and indeterminacy of language lead to rampant deconstructivism or even to a despairing distrust of the ability to accurately convey meaning at all, while for others (see Gadamer and Habermas ) it lead to an analysis of how people can and do bridge the gaps between world views to find meaning and solidarity, tentative as it may be, and make mutually beneficial and respectful decisions.

Where does all of this leave us? You may be thinking “I am not surprised that philosophers find themselves in such a pickle, arguing as they do in their ivory towers over esoteric ideas, but what about the real world, the concrete world, where scientists discover new technologies that work just fine and people have to get up and go to work and cook for the kids every day?” Questions about the ultimate nature of truth, reality, knowledge, and meaning are just not that important to consider in much of what people do. True enough. But then again, one could say the same about questioning the quality of the air we breath and the water we drink; or the benefits of the “new math” and other learning theories upon the education of our children; or the surprising degree to which the US economy rests upon speculative investments from non-democratic nations; or the impact the oppressions placed upon our forbearers has upon our psychological makeup. Similarly, we can get by just fine without considering topics such as “how can I communicate better with people at home and work?” and “why am I happy even though there are so many good things in my life?” Like all these things that have significant impacts on the quality of life, we can get by just fine without thinking about how the mind works or how we assign certainty to our beliefs. But its probably beneficial that that more of us think more about it, and that some of us think deeply about it, to create the world we want our children to inherit. And…its fun, isn’t it?

I’ve been leading you on long enough about the answers to the list of “questions classical philosophers have struggled with,” and my ruse is probably quite transparent (if not silly). (The answer is not “42” by the way.) The answer, to your non-astonishment, is that they all have the same answer, which might be called “non-sense.” There is no definitive or generally agreed answer to any of these questions, and, according to most modern philosophers, no such answers are even possible. (See later essay on unanswerable questions and paradoxes.) They are in one sense meaningless, in that any proposed answer can not be logically verified or falsified (a conclusion compatible with the Positivist view). The philosopher Wittgenstein believed that “philosophers had obscured [things] by misusing language and by the asking of meaningless questions.”³ Yet, in another sense they are full of meaning because scholars assign these questions great significance.

So there you have it. The search for “what is true” (and “what is right”) is ongoing and still has significance, from very general philosophical questions to very specific questions in daily life. Philosophers since Kant have shown us that this quest should include what we know about “how the mind works,” including an understanding of the influences of language, culture, the unconscious, concepts, and reasoning faculties. Though there are still a few living philosophers trying to anchor a theory in some definitive reality or ideals (they have our sympathies) the direction of modern thought seems to be toward more self-reflective, admittedly fallible, and humble method.

One aspect of contemporary wisdom is a movement from product to process, from a focus on the end-points to a focus on the journey itself. Though we have come to understand that most of the ultimate questions asked by humans have no definitive answer, we can not deny that the questions are compelling, and that there is something of value in the simple asking of them; in the shared inquiry into the direction in which they point, as points on the horizon toward which humans seem perennially called to gaze.

The following essay is a “Supplemental” one tying up a few points from the prior two essays, but after that I will shift from trying to answer the questions as if their answers exist independently of us, toward looking at the questioner and the act of questioning. In particular I will take a psychological and pragmatist look at how Ideas and Ideals operate in our search for the True and the Good.

1. Philosophers have always acknowledged human bias and flawed thinking, but traditionally these weaknesses were pointed out in others (in the average citizen or in other philosophers) and the inherent fallibility of one’s own reasoning was barely considered. Also, though both philosophers and the average person have made significant progress over the centuries in understanding the fallibility of ideas, for both philosophers and the rest of us the consistent application of this concept in daily work and life lags far behind our intellectual understanding. I will return to this theme later. [↩]
2. Page 234 in A Beginner’s Guide To Reality, by Jim Baggott. Pegasus Books, NY, 2006. [↩]
3. From his Philosophical Investigations ; where he also speaks of becoming “entangled in our own rules” (#125). [↩]